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Thank you for this opportunity to discuss some important 
developments in our region, in particular, the emergence of 
what might be called mega-regionalism.
Let me explain what I mean by that phrase, identify the 
origins of the phenomenon and discuss a few aspects of its 
implications, as well as talk about how the mega-regionalism 
game might play out.
What Is Mega Regionalism?
By mega-regionalism I mean not only the new multi-cou-
ntry trade agreements in the Asia Pacific but also the extent 
of interaction between them.
We have had some multi country agreements (rather than 
having just two countries involved as in a bilateral) for some 
time, like that around ASEAN and another around North 
America.
But the change has been new structures like the TPP, now 
with 11 members across the Pacific, and the Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership of RCEP which is the ASEAN 
+ 6 group in East Asia and includes NEAsia, Australia, NZ 
and India.
So compared to others, these newer agreements have a 
wider geographic coverage, and membership is not limited 
to economies which are next to each other. 
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This audience is more likely to be familiar with TPP, of 
which Chile was a founding member, and less so about RCEP, 
so perhaps today that is one point of interest.
Why Has Mega Regionalism Grown
Where did the interest in these newer multi country struc-
tures come from? Factors include
 · The economics of larger membership – trade agreements 
with bigger membership generate much greater gains for 
each participant. This does depend on the size of the trade 
barriers being reduced, the complementarities among eco-
nomies in the group and their size but there is a positive 
link to larger membership.
 · The growth in interest in the concept of supply chains, 
based on the fragmentation of production, and wanting 
to have a policy environment that supports their growth 
across a group of countries (bilateral agreements are not 
enough – they maybe inconsistent and offer insufficient 
coverage) 
 · The growth of bilateral agreements itself has added, it 
is argued, to complexity and to costs of doing business 
which we have sought to ameliorate by wider membership 
agreements.
There is also an interest in making greater progress on new 
issues, like regulation and competition and SOEs, as traditional 
trade barriers - while significant in some areas - decline overall.
Also there is some experience that dealing bilaterally is very 
hard (look at Australia’s efforts in NEAsia) so having more 
countries with more change going on creates more scope to 
reach a deal that can be sold to domestic political interests. 
At least, that might be the hope.
Some of these points beg the question of why not, if bigger 
membership is better, go to the WTO, which has global mem-
bership. The WTO has a vital contribution in this context of 
mega-regionalism – more on that shortly - but proponents of 
these new structures would probably say that more members 
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are better, yes, but there are diminishing returns since nego-
tiating costs start to rise in a larger group. 
Are These Some Specific Events That Triggered Recent 
Development?
The increasing membership of the TPP is one of these 
events. The US decision in 2010 to become even more active 
in TPP was critical. 
According to the communication from the USTR to Con-
gress, its motivations include access to rapidly growing Asian 
markets, the prospect of exports and jobs including for US hi 
tech firms and SMEs, and also treatment of issues that were of 
concern to Congress such as labour rights and environmental 
standards. 
But also, as we’ll see in a moment, there had been considera-
tion of East Asian based agreements since 2003 for ASEAN+3 
and 2006 from ASEAN+6 and participation in the TPP made 
sense in part as insurance in that context for the US too. 
However, this decision by the US led to a reaction in East 
Asia, perhaps making US expectations, of the creation of a 
trade agreement from which it was excluded, actually come 
true – this sort of interactivity is a feature of the era of mega-
regionalism. 
The recent big addition to TPP has been Japan which 
confirmed its interest in March this year. The other members 
now have to accept it.1 Then in May there is the 17th round 
of negotiations in Lima.
Japan had been agonizing for years about the joining the 
TPP. Proponents argued it would support the reform agenda 
in Japan, including in agriculture. This was much resisted, 
including in public demonstrations.
The tension with China around the Senkaku Islands issue, 
then provided greater scope for the Japanese Prime Minister 
to argue for a clear commitment to an arrangement in which 
the US was playing a lead role and thereby demonstrate a 
commitment to the relationship with the US.
If so, here is an example of what is another key feature of 
the era of mega-regionalism, that is, the interplay of strategic 
1  This was done at the APEC Trade Ministers meeting in Surabaya 
on 21 April 2013.
114
Estudios Internacionales 175 (2013) • Universidad de Chile
or security issues with the evolution of the architecture of 
these international economic regimes. 
Also of assistance to the break the domestic bottleneck in 
Japan was support from the US and what has been called the 
‘summit wave’ in which following a meeting of the Japanese 
PM and the US President in February they said
 «The two governments confirm that should Japan par-
ticipate in the TPP negotiations, all goods would be subject 
to negotiation,» Obama and Abe said in a joint statement, 
adding, «As the final outcome will be determined during the 
negotiations, (Japan) is not required to make a prior com-
mitment to unilaterally eliminate all tariffs upon joining the 
TPP (discussions).»2
In fact, the second part of this statement was obvious, and 
nothing new, but it did give the Japanese PM a message to 
take home.
As I understand it, the debate in Japan around the TPP will 
shift to what exclusions might be sought, rather than whether 
or not to be in the arrangement. Whether this shift suits other 
members of the TPP, given their apparent level of ambition, 
is still a question.
The development of RCEP itself might have been part of 
the story, more on that in a moment.
In any case, the extent of activity in TPP, the sense that 
the process was getting serious, the growth in the size of the 
meetings and the number of them already completed, plus 
the joining of Japan, all adds to the perspective that TPP is 
‘going somewhere’.
What About The Interaction With Rcep?
This is part of the story, but what about RCEP – where 
did it come from?
ASEAN and its dialogue partners had been discussing for 
some time a wider arrangement in East Asia, partly prompted 
2  More detail at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/23/na-
tional/abe-obama-talks-set-stage-for-tpp-entry
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by the experience of the Asian Financial Crisis, a desire to be 
more self reliant and a perception (misleading actually) that 
regional trade was becoming more concentrated – it was so 
in components, but not final products where in fact export 
shares to the region were falling, not rising.
There are had been parallel tracks, ASEAN+3 favoured 
by China in particular and ASEAN+6, favoured by at least 
some parts of the Japanese bureaucracy, perhaps to provide a 
larger group in which to manage its relationship with China. 
By 2009, working groups had been set up to work on spe-
cific topics related to these arrangements. But ASEAN with the 
split sponsorship was stuck, which should it support? 
These activities continued on parallel tracks for some time 
then the matter was resolved when in August 2011 China and 
Japan made a joint proposal for a regional FTA, which was 
incorporated into a concept that ASEAN leaders had already 
been developing. 
A key driver of the coming together of China and Japan 
on this proposal, essentially founded in China’s willingness to 
push less strongly for ASEAN+3, was a result of progress in 
the TPP, as just described, which was also captured in a state-
ment of ambition made at the APEC leaders meeting in 2011.
So TPP itself prompted a resolution around plans for 
arrangements in East Asia.
How To Compare Rcep And Tpp?
There are some significant differences in the two arran-
gements.
One is the membership structure: RCEP apparently has 
ASEAN at the Centre, and with China in and the US out, and 
TPP having a US focus.
But they also have different philosophies – or what is more 
often called the ‘level of ambition’.
RCEP takes an ASEAN approach of allowing for different 
pathways for different economies and allowing for differential 
treatment. This is designed to accommodate the perception 
that adjusting to globalization is costly, and although the be-
nefits are huge, the confidence to proceed demands an ability 
to quarantine some areas as well as time to adjust and to 
build capacity to compete and manage a more open economy.
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RCEP most likely will build up from the bottom, on the set 
of agreements which ASEAN already has with each one of the 
+6 countries. However, these vary mightily and there is a lot 
of work to do to join them together. On the other hand, this 
is a less risky approach than trying to write a new agreement 
which, with the philosophy just outlined would most likely 
lead to ‘just another agreement’, rather than making progress 
to integration. 
The RCEP philosophy would also make it possible, I think, 
for the members to sign up to something relatively soon even 
though the TPP team might say it is ‘soft’. But that possibility 
is also putting pressure on the TPP to meet its deadlines and 
to conclude. Indeed, reports are that the US is keen to sign an 
agreement this year.
TPP has the expectation of a standard approach for all 
economies to sign on to, across a wider range of areas. There 
might be some variation in schedules, but everyone will be 
expected to get to the same end point. It would be one agre-
ement, not a bundle of agreements.
There are however challenges in the TPP process, given the 
various sensitive sectors of the key players. 
 · Agriculture remains a theme of those sectors, an area of 
mutual interest to Chile and Australia.
 · Textiles and clothing is a sensitive area in developed eco-
nomies
There is debate about the economics of the IP protection 
position of the US3 and about the provision of investor-state 
dispute settlement. 
Some economies are asking questions such as - is it worth 
the effort on the new issues if we don’t get the market access 
that we seek?
Furthermore, the TPP does not align with current supply 
chains, though its proponents may argue new chains may 
follow its construction.4
3  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/31/intellectual-property-
and-wealth-transfers-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ 
4  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/06/will-the-tpp-facilitate-
or-disrupt-supply-chains/ 
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But if there does emerge a rush to complete the TPP, perhaps 
because RCEP looks like it is able to do so, this might also lead 
to some compromise on the original ambitions. Observers are 
reporting some signals in this respect.
SCENARIOS
So how might his play out.
The agreements could continue on separate paths but the 
number of mutual members might rise, as on the one hand if 
access to Asian markets is a drawcard for RCEP and on the 
other hand if the TPP style is regarded as useful to support 
domestic reform as well as contribute to integration.
The two options might even be regarded by some as com-
plementary, and choices of which to join made by economies 
at different stages of development.
But the prize remains convergence, convergence to an 
arrangement in which both China and the US participate. The 
Petri/Plummer modeling results point to very big numbers for 
the gain if this is achieved. 
And anxiety would remain without that - while the world’s 
two great powers are in separate trade and investment agre-
ements.
So convergence is becoming the talking point. Will it and 
can it be done?
Our colleague Jusuf Wanandi has written
‘both the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) can be complementary, 
if the US is willing to lower the TPP threshold, while the RCEP 
should raise its threshold to become more meaningful for the 
region to participate. Only then the most maximum results can 
be achieved for the benefit of the region.’5 
This is a very interesting idea but it is a challenge to think 
about how to make convergence to avoid the resulting agre-
ement becoming just another compromised trade agreement, 
admittedly one with a lot of members, sitting in the bowl of 
noodles that already exists.
5  http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-324560954/insight-
china-peaceful-rise.html  
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Policy Implications
My response to that challenge would be to say let’s have the 
conversation about convergence and what it might look like. 
But this conversation has many dimensions, it has to carefully 
designed and I suggest the following aspects are critical.
First, the conversation has to take place outside the agre-
ements themselves, because everyone should be involved, cu-
rrent members and non members (that is potential members). 
Indeed some analysts have argued for a ‘third track’, in which 
China and the US continue to rehearse their common interests. 
I think we have that. APEC and its related networks is a good 
place to do that. Some clarity about the purpose of all is also 
important constant reference to what we are trying to achieve 
and why it matters to business will help. 
Speaking of APEC, it has another contribution in delivery 
of capacity building, which can help narrow the philosophical 
gap between RCEP and TPP.
Second, it will be important to refer to implications for the 
WTO and to how to transfer commitments here in the con-
verged structure to there in the WTO. This is because of the 
importance of trade links with the rest of the world for East 
Asia in particular, as I have mentioned. Some commentators 
have called for a resolution of the tensions and uncertainties 
I have been speaking about by the multilateralisation of any 
outcomes in both agreements as they occur, which is an im-
portant and interesting idea.6
And then third the terms of accession also matter – it is im-
portant in order to achieve convergence that the clubs remain 
open, and that new members are not unduly discriminated 
against in their entry conditions. There is a risk of that action 
by the founding members.
So to conclude, in this changing environment which I have 
tried to characterize the old institutions like APEC and the 
WTO really do still matter, and indeed they now may matter 
even more.
6  http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/06/how-to-multilateralise-
asian-regionalism/ 
